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English Academic Discourse has always presented itself as a neutral vehicle of objective 
fact. Through the use of clearly defi ned terms and straightforward syntax, and the studied 
avoidance of forms of overt manipulation of the reader, it claims to offer a transparent 
window onto some pre-existing external reality. Today, however, most linguists agree that 
objectivity is a linguistic construct, achieved by the systematic use of grammatical forms 
such as nominalizations and the passive voice which mask human agency. Similarly, it is 
now generally understood that even the most positivistic science texts contain a certain 
amount of rhetorical manoeuvring designed to convince the reader of the truth value 
and utility of the claims made. This paper draws upon a range of linguistic, historical 
and philosophical sources to question this discourse’s status as the hegemonic vehicle of 
knowledge in the modern world.
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1 Introduction
English Academic Discourse (EAD) is slowly but surely becoming the 
only acceptable vehicle for knowledge in the modern world. Twenty years ago, 
scientifi c articles were still routinely produced and published in languages like 
French, German and Russian and circulated widely within their respective areas 
of infl uence. But since the turn of the millennium, this has changed. English has 
emerged as the unequivocal lingua franca of academia, and as a result, publishing 
in ‘international journals’ is now synonymous with publication in that language 
(Lillis & Curry 2010: 6). 
Within English, there has been a similar erosion of difference, this time 
between areas of knowledge. The scientifi c paradigm, with its close links to 
technology, industry and business, enjoys unparalleled prestige in modern 
society1 to the extent that the humanities and social sciences are now under 
considerable pressure to assimilate to it in order to be taken seriously by funding 
bodies. One of the consequences of this is that the discourse used in subjects like 
history, literary studies and sociology is fast becoming indistinguishable from 
that of the exact sciences. Predicated upon the understanding that it is possible 





to transmit facts about the world in an entirely objective manner, this hegemonic 
discourse ostensibly eschews all authorial manipulation and uses clearly 
defi ned terms and straightforward syntax to create an effect of transparency. 
Meanwhile, the alternative modes of writing that appeared in the late twentieth 
century precisely to critique this premise (such as the emancipatory écritures of 
feminism and postcolonialism, the dense opaque textuality of Critical Theory, 
and the alternative discourses of qualitative research2) seem to have retreated into 
ghettos, no doubt deterred by unsympathetic reviews suggesting that they were a 
passing phase that has since been outgrown.3
This process of uniformization has been accompanied by the development 
of lucrative language industries for which the discourse is a commodity to be 
packaged and sold. Style manuals and course books are churned out in their 
hundreds in response to an ever more differentiated market; courses in English 
for Academic Purposes are organised in universities around the world; and there 
are increasing numbers of journals and conferences dedicated in large part, 
or even exclusively, to EAD. As an entity, it is now so clearly defi ned and so 
widespread that for many it is inconceivable that knowledge could be construed 
in any other way. 
However, as this article attempts to show, EAD’s prestige rests, at least in part, 
upon a premise that is fundamentally false. The claim that plain straightforward 
prose offers a transparent window4 onto some independently existing reality was 
fi rst made during the 16th and 17th centuries to discredit the text-based learning 
of the Scholastics and provide grist for the ‘new science’ that was then in the 
ascendancy. But, as I attempt to show in this article, objectivity is itself a linguistic 
construct and the ‘facts’ that the discourse purports to transmit are not so much 
discovered as created. There is also a great deal of rhetoric involved in the 
presentation of scientifi c knowledge, despite the negative connotations accruing 
to the word within the scientifi c paradigm. Indeed, the trope of transparency may 
itself ultimately prove to be a rhetorical device, designed to reinforce the status 
of a particular form of knowledge at the expense of others.
This article draws upon a range of linguistic, historical and philosophical 
sources to question EAD’s status as the hegemonic vehicle of knowledge in the 
modern world. After a brief review of its structure and history, it proceeds to 
deconstruct some of its central premises, before closing with a refl ection about 
why the transparency trope has persisted for so long.
2  What is English Academic Discourse (EAD)?
Nowadays it is fashionable to talk about academic discourses in the plural, 
in order to emphasise the differences that undoubtedly exist between different 
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disciplinary areas and academic genres (e.g. Hyland 1999b, 2000). However, 
I shall argue in this article that these are only nuances or surface variants of 
a discourse that is so ubiquitous in the Anglo-Saxon world that it is scarcely 
viewed as a discourse at all. This is because all mainstream academic writing in 
English is grounded in the same epistemological principle, namely the belief in 
the existence of an extralinguistic reality that can be unproblematically accessed 
and described using plain language.
This was made clear by a recent survey of academic style manuals (Bennett 
2009), which revealed a remarkable consensus as to what constituted good 
academic writing in English. Apart from a few minor variations between 
disciplines (such a preference for personal or impersonal forms), all but one5 of 
the works consulted made the same recommendations. These may be summarized 
as follows:
a)  General Principles:
–  clarity, economy and precision (avoiding vagueness, verbosity, 
circumlocution)
–  structured rational argument supported by evidence (avoidance of dubious 
persuasive techniques)
– fact clearly distinguished from opinion
– caution and restraint about claims (use of hedging devices, etc.)
– incorporation of theory through citation and referencing
b)  Text Structure:
–  text organised into sections: Introduction/Development/Conclusion (in 
the humanities and arts) Introduction/Method/Results/Discussion (in the 
empirical sciences)
–  sections organised into paragraphs, each dealing with one particular idea
–  hierarchical structure at all ranks, with general statement of theme 
followed by development
–  coherence created by thematic progression and made explicit through 
signposting
–  cohesion (through use of linkers, back- and forward referencing, ellipsis, 
etc.)
c)  Sentence Length and Structure: 
–  complete sentences, each containing one main point, with straightforward 
syntax
–  sentences relatively short or varied in length, rarely containing more than 
about 40-50 words 
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d)  Lexis: 
–  technical terminology from discipline (in the sciences) 
–  lexis used denotatively with clear defi nition of key words (in the 
humanities)
–  concrete terms rather than abstractions
The manuals were also united by a distrust of overt rhetoric. Many 
warned explicitly against the manipulation of the reader by means of emotive 
language, implying that the only licit forms of persuasion were straightforward 
demonstration and rational argument supported by evidence. Figurative language 
was also broadly discouraged, although in some cases with provisos for certain 
humanities subjects.
What are the epistemological presuppositions underpinning these 
prescriptions? First of all, the discourse clearly assumes that there is a world 
outside language that has an objective neutral existence (in the sense that it 
appears the same to everyone, irrespective of culture, language or background) 
and that this world is accessible through our senses (hence the importance of 
observation, experiment and measurement). It also assumes that language merely 
serves to label this pre-existing reality, which is why such emphasis is given 
to plainness and simplicity. These philosophies (positivism, empiricism and 
realism respectively) permeate Anglo-Saxon culture so thoroughly that most 
native speakers of English are not even aware that other perspectives exist. As 
Berman (1988: 110) pointed out in his book on the reception of structuralism 
and poststructuralism in the United States, “in America, the controversies are 
customarily within empiricism” (my emphasis).
Yet this theory of knowledge has not always been with us, and is historically 
contingent in the sense that it came into being at a particular time and in a 
particular cultural context. Let us now look a little closer at its origins.
2.1 History of English Academic Discourse
EAD can trace its genealogy back to the Scientifi c Revolution of the 17th 
century, which was when the empiricist paradigm fi rst began to assert itself 
in the modern world. Before that, knowledge, understood as philosophy, was 
believed to reside in words, and students would be trained in the use of language 
and exegesis of authoritative texts (scriptures and certain classical texts that 
had been assimilated into the system). According to Christian humanists like 
Erasmus, language was a civilizing force, which could move men to virtue and 
help promote peace, justice and liberty. Hence, eloquence was cultivated as an 
educational discipline and literary ideal, and abundant speech was valued as an 
indication of inner worth.
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In the Classical rhetorical tradition, which dominated the educational 
curriculum throughout the Renaissance period, there were several aspects to 
language that needed to be considered when preparing a text. In addition to the 
referential dimension (logos) there was also a moral dimension (ethos) and an 
emotive dimension (pathos). There were also three styles from which the orator 
could choose in accordance with his aim and his audience: the grand style, which 
aimed to arouse the audience to a state of heightened emotion and placed great 
emphasis on the aesthetic dimension with a vast repertoire of tropes and fi gures; 
the plain style, which, as its name suggests, was more austere; and a middle style 
that was somewhere in between the two.
It was in the 16th century that this began to change and Rhetoric started to drop 
out of fashion in England. A movement developed known as Anti-Ciceronianism, 
which was critical of the rhetorical extravagances of the age and the tendency to 
cultivate style at the expense of content. Then, in 1620, Francis Bacon’s Novum 
Organum laid out a programme for a new approach to knowledge that would 
focus on the things of the physical world rather than texts (‘things not words’), 
using observation, experiment and inductive reasoning instead of the deductive 
variety favoured by the Scholastics. Crucially Bacon advocated the plain style of 
rhetoric as the only appropriate one for this new science, a call that was echoed 
by other signifi cant fi gures of the period such as Ben Jonson, Hobbes and Locke.
When the Royal Society was formed in 1660 it made plain style a prerequisite, 
not only privileging content above form but also making this knowledge more 
democratic. As Thomas Spratt expressed it in his History of the Royal Society 
of 1667:
They have exacted from all their members, a close, naked, natural way of 
speaking; positive expressions clear senses; a native easiness: bringing all things 
as near the Mathematical plainness, as they can: and preferring the language of 
Artisans, Countrymen, and Merchants, before that, of Wits or Scholars.
It is no coincidence that many of these early English scientists were 
Protestants, as Robert Merton ([1938] 2001) asserted in his ground-breaking 
work on the sociology of science, for the plain style encoded Protestant values. In 
addition to the drive for simplicity and economy which they applied to all things 
in life, there was also the belief that plain unadorned language allowed direct 
access to the truth about things. That is to say, just as the Protestants preferred 
to do without the mediation of priests, icons and rituals in the religious sphere, 
so they eschewed rhetoric in the pursuit of knowledge, perceiving it as a form of 
obfuscation and manipulation. Over time, this led to the gradual elimination of 
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Rhetoric from the school curriculum and the reifi cation of the plain style in the 
scientifi c domain.
This Protestant belief that simple straightforward language offers a 
transparent window onto the Truth is still very deep-rooted in Anglo-Saxon 
culture and underpins not only EAD but also ongoing campaigns in other spheres 
(such as the Plain English Campaign in public administration and the Fight the 
Fog Campaign in the EU). It is even espoused by some linguists, such as the 
Systemic-Functional school which asserts the naturalness of the relationship 
between English grammatical structures and the outside world.
What exactly does it mean to make abstract writing ‘plain’. Essentially what 
we are looking at is the relationship between semantics and grammar – between 
meaning and form. In ‘plain’ English, there is a ‘natural’ relationship between the 
two. Actions come out as verbs, descriptions as adjectives, logical relations as 
conjunctions and so on (Halliday & Martin 1993: 218).
This is, however, a very Anglocentric perspective. For one, there are 
languages that do not distinguish between processes and participants6, which 
makes it diffi cult to argue that the relationship between semantics and grammar 
could ever be ‘natural’. What is more, plain speaking is not valued in the same 
way everywhere. For example, in the Catholic countries of Southern Europe, 
where Scholasticism and Rhetoric continued to be taught long after they had been 
abandoned in Protestant North, the grand style became something of an identity 
marker and was cultivated systematically in schools and universities. Vestiges 
of this attitude can still be seen in the way academics from these countries write 
today.
In short, then, the discourse that is the hegemonic vehicle for knowledge in 
the modern world has not always been as widespread as it is today. It arose in 
a particular historical context in response to certain sociocultural pressures, and 
achieved dominance at the expense of other competing discourses. Its claim to 
transparency should thus be understood in the light of that struggle, as part of a 
move to gain control over what was to be considered as legitimate knowledge.
3 Deconstructing English Academic Discourse
This section will describe how English Academic Discourse, like all 
‘discursive formations’ (Foucault 2002) actually constructs the world that it 
claims to refl ect. Drawing upon classic works by linguists such as Halliday and 
Martin, Swales and Hyland, it focuses fi rstly on the question of objectivity, which 
is of course central to the scientifi c paradigm, and then on its corollary, the notion 
of the fact as something with indisputable truth value.
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3.1 Objectivity is a linguistic construct 
According to Halliday and Martin (1993), modern scientifi c discourse was 
born in the 17th century with the writings of Isaac Newton, who for the fi rst 
time employed a linguistic device that would subsequently become central to 
the scientifi c worldview. That device was nominalization, the resource through 
which processes are reinterpreted into nouns by means of a mechanism called 
‘grammatical metaphorization’.
Where the everyday ‘mother tongue’ of commonsense knowledge construes 
reality as a balanced tension between things and processes, the elaborated register 
of scientifi c knowledge reconstrues it as an edifi ce of things. It holds reality still, 
to be kept under observation and experimented with; and in doing so, interprets 
it not as changing with time (as the grammar of clauses interprets it) but as 
persisting – or rather, persistence – through time, which is the mode of being of a 
noun (Halliday & Martin 1993: 15).
Nominalizations serve two important purposes in scientifi c discourse. Firstly, 
by compressing complex phenomena into a single semiotic entity, they enable 
the construction of technical taxonomies. Secondly, they also permit information 
that has already been presented in clausal form to be concisely repackaged 
in subsequent sentences in order to create a discourse that moves forward in 
logical and coherent steps, each building on what went before. This of course has 
implications for the development of rational argument (which, as we have seen, 
is the only persuasive device that is truly accepted by the scientifi c paradigm), 
and for thematic progression (i.e. the internal organization of the text) (ibid.: 
81-82). 
With this repackaging of clauses into nouns, the focus of the discourse shifted 
away from the human observer to the things of the real world that formed the object 
of his study. This process was complemented by a second grammatical metaphor, 
the agentless passive, which came into fashion in the 19th century (ibid.: 58). 
According to Ding (1998), this serves a number of different rhetorical functions: 
as well as making the discourse sound objective and impersonal, it also has a 
universalizing function by removing idiosyncrasy or doubt, enhances authority 
in the presentation of methods or results and emphasises the communality of the 
scientifi c project. 
These two grammatical metaphorizations, then, effectively create the world 
that science claims to observe – a world of static things from which all subjectivity 
has apparently been excised. This is a very different world from that inhabited 
by the Renaissance humanists, for whom emotivity, aesthetics and ethics were 
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essential components of knowledge. Yet nowadays even the humanities and 
social sciences aspire to transparency, producing a pared-down prose that does 
not problematize the act of knowing or the relationship between language and 
‘reality’. As Halliday and Martin (1993: 220) put it, after three hundred years of 
colonization by the discourse of science, there is now an “essential continuity 
between humanities and science as far as interpreting the world is concerned”. 
And yet, as I have already suggested, this transparency, like objectivity, 
is something of an illusion. For it is manifestly impossible to eliminate the 
interpersonal element altogether, and even the most positivistic science texts 
contain spaces for subjectivity, as in the construction of the authorial voice and 
stance, and the (covert) appeal to a conceptualized reader.
3.1.1  The persistence of rhetoric
As we have seen, the early scientists, like the Anti-Ciceronians that came 
before them, were highly sceptical of the way that words could be used to 
manipulate and aimed to overcome this by presenting their fi ndings in plain 
simple language that would allow the facts to speak for themselves. Ironically, 
though, a great deal of rhetoric is actually required in order to achieve this effect, 
as Swales (1990: 112) has wryly pointed out.7 Indeed, if academic discourse 
were as straightforward as it makes itself out to be, there would be no need for 
the multitude of manuals and courses that exist to teach it. What these do, in 
fact, is to coach people in the rhetoric of science – that is to say, in techniques to 
persuade the scholarly community of the plausibility of their claims.
One example of rhetorical manoeuvring typical of the science can be found 
in the introductions to research articles. Swales (1990: 137-166) describes how 
these introductions serve primarily to generate interest in the topic and convince 
colleagues of the pertinence of the research. This so-called CARS (‘Create a 
Research Space’) approach involves three moves: i) establishing the broad 
territory for the study; ii) identifying a niche that has not yet been thoroughly 
investigated; and iii) occupying that niche. Thus, by presenting the study as 
responding to a need within a broader fi eld of research, the introduction not only 
asserts the work’s right to be taken seriously by other experts in the area, but also 
creates a motivation for it. 
This is a form of self-promotion that has clearly been infl uenced by the 
discourse of marketing, as Mauranen (1993) has pointed out. And it is not unique 
to research article introductions. Hyland (2000: 63-84) has shown how similar 
strategies are present in abstracts, while Gross and Chesley (2012) have explored 
how they are systematically used in biomedical articles in order to ‘sell’ research 
that may actually be in breach of scientifi c ethics. Other rhetorical strategies may 
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include the construction of expert identity in text books (Hyland 2000: 104-129) 
and of authority in PhD theses (Thompson 2012), dialogism in argumentative 
essays (Thompson 2001) and the use of attitude, relational and person markers 
(Hyland 1999: 104).
Also central to the scientifi c worldview is the use of epistemic modality8 to 
carefully modulate the degree of certainty to be attributed to a particular claim. 
These devices, which are as central to this discourse as nominalizations,9 serve a 
number of rhetorical functions. In addition to refl ecting the organized skepticism 
that is one of cornerstone of scientifi c ethos, they also have a stance-creating 
function (Hyland 1999: 101), projecting authorial honesty and modesty (or, 
conversely, assurance and conviction), demonstrating respect for colleagues’ 
views and readers’ face needs, and indicating involvement in the topic and 
solidarity with readers. In the hands of a competent writer, hedging and boosting 
devices can actually reinforce claims to objectivity by carefully distinguishing 
between fact and opinion, as well as being used to strengthen one’s own argument 
at the expense of an opponent’s.
The exact epistemic device chosen (ranging from highly tentative forms such 
as ‘it would seem…’ to the categorical assertion of the universalising present ‘it 
is’) may provide an indication of the claim’s precise status within the discourse 
community at a particular moment in time. As such, they contribute to the creation 
of facts. For although ‘scientifi c facts’ are still broadly understood within our 
empiricist paradigm to have objective truth value and to be gradually uncovered 
in a linear process of discovery, this is another dimension of the ‘transparency 
trope’ that does not stand up to scrutiny. As Hyland (1999a: 342) puts it: 
The construction of academic facts is a social process, with the cachet of acceptance 
only bestowed on a claim after negotiation with editors, expert reviewers and 
journal readers, the fi nal ratifi cation granted, of course, with the citation of the 
claim by others and, eventually, the disappearance of all acknowledgment as it is 
incorporated into the literature of the discipline.
Let us look at this process in a little more detail.
3.2 ‘Facts’ are made not found
A glance at the dictionary defi nitions of the word ‘fact’ reveals the 
pervasiveness of the positivist mindset in Anglo-Saxon culture. All the main 
English dictionaries persistently defi ne the word in objective terms: “something 
that actually exists; reality; truth” (Dictionary.com); “a thing that is known 
or proved to be true” (Merriam-Webster); “an event or thing known to have 
happened or existed; a truth verifi able from experience or observation” (Collins). 
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Indeed, this view is so entrenched in Anglo-Saxon culture that the ‘fact creation’ 
sounds like an oxymoron. Yet etymologically the word actually derives from the 
past participle of the Latin word for ‘do’ or ‘make’, and therefore means literally 
‘things made’ (this is of course much more evident in the Romance languages 
where the word for ‘fact’ is similar to or even identical with the past participle 
of the verb).
When we consider the things that are considered to be incontrovertible ‘facts’ 
today (e.g. that the earth is round and goes around the sun; that man descended 
from the apes; that whales are mammals rather than fi sh), we realise that they 
have not always enjoyed this status. In many cases, the process of establishing 
them as facts was a long one and involved a great deal of confl ict and sacrifi ce. 
Ultimately what was involved was convincing the powers of the period to 
subscribe to the interpretation – not always an easy matter when there were 
vested interests involved.
The situation is not so different today. The difference between a fact and 
a claim or theory is basically that the former has achieved a broad consensus 
amongst the scientifi c community to the extent that it is no longer seriously 
disputed; as such, it is entitled to appear in textbooks and encyclopaedias as a 
universal truth, unhistoricized by reference to an author, school or period (Kuhn 
[1962] 1996: 22; Hyland 1999a: 342). A theory, on the other hand, has not yet 
crystallized into a fact and is still being contested; hence, it will be attributed to a 
person or a school, and will not usually be expressed in the universalizing present 
tense. It is also less likely to appear in encyclopaedias or text books, but will 
instead be debated in academic journals as knowledge in the making.
A claim is the fi rst stage in this process, the tentative broaching of a new 
take on a subject for the appraisal of the scientifi c community. The process of 
converting a claim into fact involves convincing that community that the theory 
is plausible, in the hope that it will attract followers. When the claim is fi rst 
made, it is usually heavily hedged to protect the author’s face if it should not fi nd 
favour. If it does, it will gradually become less tentative refl ecting the author’s 
growing confi dence about its plausibility.
Central to this process is the question of citation and referencing. The 
conventions concerning citation are today fi rmly established, as is shown by 
the general consensus on the subject in the style manuals (Bennett 2009: 51). 
Articles in the sciences and social sciences generally contain a literature review, 
usually in the introduction or as a separate section near the beginning, in which 
preceding and related research on the subject is systematically acknowledged; 
and the works cited will of course be fully referenced at the end or in footnotes/
endnotes. Within the body of the text, the work of others may be referred to using 
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direct quote, paraphrase or summary, and the citation may be integral (when 
the researcher’s name appears in the citing sentence) or non-integral (when it is 
given in parenthesis or as a footnote) (Swales 1990: 148).
Swales (1990: 150-154) and Hyland (1999a, 2000: 20-40) have described 
how the mode of quotation changes in accordance with the claim’s precise 
status at any given moment. A new or controversial claim will tend to be quoted 
integrally using tentative reporting verbs (e.g. ‘X suggests/argues/proposes’), 
which do not imply any commitment on the part of the reporting author. These 
verbs will then become stronger (e.g. ‘shows/demonstrates/establishes’) as the 
claim acquires support. The tense may also change. We might expect a reference 
to a very particular or circumscribed study to use the past tense in recognition 
of its specifi city, while the present perfect may be used to suggest that the claim 
has a broader or continuing relevance or is still under discussion (Swales 1990: 
151-154). There will also be a gradual move away from integral forms of citation 
to non-integral ones, which weaken the attribution. As we have seen, the ultimate 
accolade is the “disappearance of all acknowledgement” (Hyland 1999a: 342, 
quoted above) when the claim has become a ‘fact’ of the discipline, no longer 
circumscribable by tense or attributable to a particular individual.
However, for a claim to become fact, it also needs to be broadly coherent 
with the accepted body of knowledge that currently exists about that matter in the 
discipline (Kuhn [1962] 1996: 111). In a context in which EAD is the hegemonic 
medium, this also means subscribing to the empiricist paradigm encoded into 
its structure, an issue that becomes particularly pertinent for scholars whose 
research is carried out in other languages.
4  Conclusion
Clearly, then, the empiricist principles upon which EAD is based are deeply 
fl awed. We cannot affi rm with any certainty that there exists an objective 
extralingual reality that appears in same way to all and is gradually revealed 
through linear and communal process of discovery. Objectivity is a linguistic 
construct, achieved largely through use of nominalizations and impersonal verbs, 
and reinforced by devices such as epistemic modality which carefully distinguish 
between what is considered to be ‘fact’ and the author’s subjective opinion.
Moreover, ‘facts’ as such have no independent existence, as we have seen: 
rather, they should be understood as claims or theories that have achieved 
consensus in the discourse community. Thus, it becomes clear just how central 
rhetoric is to the scientifi c enterprise. Indeed, it is only through effective rhetoric 
that researchers can convince their peers of the plausibility of their claims, as the 
publishers of the academic style manuals understand so well.
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We might wonder, then, why the trope of transparency is so persistently 
reiterated in those style manuals and elsewhere, and why, indeed, so many 
scientists and scholars buy into it. To some extent, Lyotard offered the answer 
back in 1979 in his famous book The Postmodern Condition. Science is ultimately 
a language game that is unable to verify its propositions through the methods 
traditionally attributed to it (Lyotard 1984: 23-27) and therefore has to resort to 
legitimizing narratives in order to justify its existence (ibid.: 27-31). The notion 
of some transcendental truth that lies outside language and is accessible through 
observation and experiment is thus one component of that narrative, a means of 
justifying its own existence.
To this may be added the effect of linguistic dominance. As we have seen, 
the discourse of science emerged in a particular historical context as a response 
to a particular set of sociocultural conditions, but acquired prestige through its 
associations with technology, industry and emerging capitalism. This allowed 
it to colonize other areas, creating calques of itself throughout the English-
speaking world.
With the globalization of academia, it has now spread much further afi eld 
to become the dominant vehicle of knowledge worldwide. What is more, it 
is no longer restricted to science, but is also used increasingly for the social 
sciences and humanities, despite the fact that these subjects are linguistically 
and culturally embedded (De Swaan 2001) and therefore not easily transplanted 
to another medium. It is here that the trope of transparency truly comes into its 
own. As a fi gure of speech in “the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric” (White 1997: 27), 
transparency is EAD’s unique selling point, the means by which it distinguishes 
itself from the academic discourses of other languages. That is to say, while those 
are perceived to be somehow partial and biased, or obfuscated by unnecessary 
adornment and ornamentation, it alone, with its plain diction and straightforward 
syntax, claims to offer a window onto ‘reality’ as it truly is.
The irony is, however, that the knowledge produced within the ambit of 
non-empiricist paradigms (such as those that have traditionally dominated 
humanities subjects in much of Continental Europe) often has to be radically 
rewritten in translation in order to acquire the veneer of transparency necessary 
for it to be acceptable to the Anglophone discourse community.10 Transparency 
is thus revealed to be a surface effect, achieved through the imposition of certain 
grammatical structures and lexical choices at the expense of others, formulations 
which are designed to sound reassuringly familiar to the target reader, but 
communicate very little because their universe of reference lies elsewhere. In 
the absence of a theory of knowledge that takes account of the way different 
languages mediate and structure our perception of the world, this discourse 
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begins to seem less like a window onto the outside world than a refl ecting mirror 
that constantly devolves our own image back to us.
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(Endnotes)
1  Funding in many countries is increasingly ring-fenced for the so-called STEM subjects (sciences, 
technology, engineering and mathematics).
2  These include personal narratives, impressionistic tales, transcriptions of interviews, polyphonic 
texts, performative texts, hypermedia texts, etc. (cf. Woods 2006).
3  E.g. a review in the Times Literary Supplement of April 2008 describes an example of such 
discourse in a recent volume as “so old-fashioned, so locked in the critical indulgence of the 
late twentieth century, that it makes the work seem dated even as it comes fresh from the press” 
(Bate, J. ‘Dampit and Moll,’ TLS April 25 2008, 3-7).
4  The term ‘windowpane prose’ actually originated with George Orwell (‘Why I Write?’, fi rst 
published in Gangrel, London, summer 1946), though the concept is part of a long tradition that 
stretches back through Quiller-Couch, Hazlitt and Swift to Ben Jonson and Francis Bacon. Cf. 
Section 2.1.
5  Woods, P. (2006/1999) Successful Writing for Qualitative Researchers. London and New York: 
Routledge. This work was contesting the dominant discourse by promoting alternative discourses 
for use in social science qualitative research.
6 Such as Salish and Wakashan (cf. Jelinek & Demers 1994).
7  “The art of the matter, as far as the creation of facts is concerned, lies in deceiving the reader into 
thinking that there is no rhetoric, /…/ and that the facts are indeed speaking for themselves.”
8  These include hedging devices to express caution or restraint (expressed typically by modal verbs, 
such as may/might/could; adverbials like ‘perhaps’, ‘possibly’ and main verbs such as ‘it appears’ 
or ‘suggests’ to replace more categorical alternatives) and boosters to express certainty (obviously, 
defi nitely, of course / will, must).
9  Robert Boyle employed hedging devices in his scientifi c treatises, a decade or so prior to the 
publication of the fi rst Transactions of the Royal Society in 1665, and even refl ected explicitly 
about this practice: “…in almost every one of the following essays, I /…/ speak so doubtingly, 
and use so often perhaps, it seems, it is not improbable and other such expressions, as argue a 
diffi dence to the truth of the opinions I incline to…” (Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle in Six 
Volumes: Experimental Essays, 1772: 307, Rivington).
10 This question has been explored in more detail in Bennett 2007a, 2007b and 2015.
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